Theorists, Get Over Yourselves: A Response to Steven D. Smith by Koppelman, Andrew
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 5 Religious Law in the 21st Century Article 2
5-15-2014
Theorists, Get Over Yourselves: A Response to
Steven D. Smith
Andrew Koppelman
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew Koppelman Theorists, Get Over Yourselves: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 41 Pepp. L. Rev. 937 (2013)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol41/iss5/2
 937 
 Theorists, Get Over Yourselves: 
A Response to Steven D. Smith 
Andrew Koppelman* 
 
Steven D. Smith is one of our most powerful critics of contemporary 
liberal theory.  He has an acute sense of the hidden flaws and gaps in 
contemporary conventional wisdom.  Even those who disagree must, if they 
are honest, carefully consider his arguments. 
In his most recent work, he claims that in our political culture the case 
for the specific protection of religious liberty—as opposed to liberty under 
other descriptions—has been undermined.1  As a consequence, he fears that, 
although some freedoms will survive, freedom of religion as such may cease 
to exist.2 
Even if his argument is sound, his fears are misplaced. 
I just wrote a book defending the specifically American practice of 
singling out religion for special protection,3 so I am unlikely to be persuaded 
by a claim that the thing cannot be done.  Stipulate, however, that my 
argument there fails, and that there is no coherent theoretical case for special 
treatment of religion.  It hardly follows that the law’s special treatment of 
religion is in any danger. 
Smith is right that there is a major school of legal and political theory 
that opposes special treatment.4  But he writes as if those people have 
already won, or are certain to win, in American politics (as opposed to the 
academy, where their view has indeed become hegemonic).5  Their view was 
 
 *  John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Northwestern 
University.  Thanks to Steve Smith for years of conversations on these issues, which have been so 
much fun that it would be a little sad if either of us finally managed to persuade the other. 
 1.   See Steven D. Smith, The Last Chapter?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 903 (2014). 
 2.  Id. at 905. 
 3.  ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013). 
 4.  Smith, The Last Chapter, supra note 1, at 904. 
 5.  It is still contested by some.  See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized 
Specialness, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. (DIALOGUE) 71 (2013). 
[Vol. 41: 937, 2014] Theorists, Get Over Yourselves 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
938 
unanimously rejected by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor.6  The 
modern American law of religion is predicated on the premise that 
religion—understood very abstractly—is a good thing.7 
Smith thinks that secularism erodes religious freedom.8  The religious 
justification for disestablishment destroys itself, because disestablishment 
cannot act on its own justification.9  It rejects its own rationales. 
Secularism, in some of its formulations, generates this paradox.  Those 
formulations are attractive to American academics who—for sociological 
reasons having to do with modern American politics—are suspicious of 
special treatment for religion and are drawn toward a neutralitarian 
liberalism.10  But that is only one possible understanding of secularism.11  It 
is not the understanding that has prevailed in American law. 
Smith thinks that there is, on the other hand, a fundamental conflict 
between religion and modern secular egalitarianism: 
Traditional faiths typically teach that some people’s deeply held 
beliefs are true while others are false.  Often they will teach that 
some people are saved and others are not, and that some ways of 
living are acceptable to God while others are abhorrent.  In these 
ways, traditional religion in its very essence will often be a scandal 
and an offense against the whole ethos of contemporary liberal 
egalitarianism, with its commitment to “equal respect” for all 
persons and all ways of life or conceptions of “the good.”12 
What makes the conflict irreconcilable is not merely the demand for 
formal equality, or even equality in the marketplace, enforced by 
 
 6.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 7.  KOPPELMAN, supra note 3. 
 8.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 906. 
 9.  Id. at 912–17. 
 10.  KOPPELMAN, supra note 3, 150–51. 
 11.  There is, of course, an enormous variety of possible understandings of secularism.  See 
TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY (2003); 
COMPARATIVE SECULARISMS IN A GLOBAL AGE (Linell E. Cady & Elizabeth Shakman Hurd eds., 
2010); AHMET T. KURU, SECULARISM AND STATE POLICIES TOWARD RELIGION: THE UNITED 
STATES, FRANCE, AND TURKEY (2009); ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD, THE POLITICS OF SECULARISM 
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2008); Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND 
ITS CRITICS 33 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998); .  
 12.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 918. 
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antidiscrimination law.13  It is that secular egalitarianism “is not content to 
regulate outward conduct, but instead seeks to penetrate into hearts and 
minds.”14 
Smith is right.  Liberalism has always been concerned with citizens’ 
character.15  Good liberal citizens must be able to distinguish reasonable, 
inevitable disagreements from those that reflect prejudice or error.16  In order 
to do this, they must develop a certain measure of ethical autonomy.17  In my 
own work on antidiscrimination law, I have argued that the law’s goal 
cannot be merely to regulate behavior.18  A racist culture will not even be 
able to deliver the minimal Nozickian goal of equal protection of citizens’ 
lives, liberty, and property.19  Liberalism must aim to transform culture. 
Specifically with respect to gay people, the aspects of culture that 
demand transformation are the tendencies to regard them as vile 
contaminants, whose welfare counts for nothing, who are appropriate targets 
of violence.20  Those tendencies have been deeply entrenched in American 
culture.21  But the effort to eradicate them is not in any tension with 
Christianity, which equally condemns them.22 
A standard—but unfair—rhetorical move within the gay rights 
movement is to treat all its adversaries as mindless bigots (when only some 
of them are).23  But that move is not a misdescription of religion so much as 
a misdescription of conservative views about sexuality.  Fair or unfair, it is a 
move that is increasingly successful.  Its success makes it less relevant to the 
 
 13.  See id. at 921–22. 
 14.  Id. at 920. 
 15.  See PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM (2000); 
STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990). 
 16.  EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
24–33 (1997). 
 17.  See id. at 39–42, 214–20. 
 18.  See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL EQUALITY (1996). 
 19.  See id. at 181–90. 
 20.  Id. at 164–65. 
 21.  Id. at 171. 
 22.  Cf. Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 919–20. 
 23.  This can take extreme forms, such as Chief Judge Walker’s finding of fact in the Proposition 
8 case (which Smith quotes) that “‘religious beliefs that gay and lesbian relationships are [. . .] 
inferior to heterosexual relationships harm gays and lesbians.’”  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra 
note 1, at 921 (quoting Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(emphasis added)). 
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status of religion, because increasingly, even very religious people are not 
troubled by gay rights.  To the extent that suspicion of religion arises out of 
the gay rights struggle, that suspicion seems likely to abate as that struggle 
does.24 
The disrespect that religious exclusivism engenders is not news.  Many 
American religions have embraced, and continue to embrace, doctrines of 
exclusive salvation, and these have not hamstrung American liberal 
democracy.25  America has long been a counterexample to Rousseau’s 
dictum that “[i]t is impossible to live in peace with people whom one 
believes are damned.”26  Liberalism characteristically is determined to live 
with such tensions.  The standard free speech casebook is a catalogue of 
illiberal speakers who, nonetheless, are allowed to proclaim their views. 
There are, undoubtedly, incoherences in the standard story that 
Americans tell themselves about religious liberty.27  Smith thinks if 
something is intellectually incoherent, it is doomed.28  But the incoherence 
of a practice’s justification is no basis for predicting that it cannot continue.  
All minds are sometimes inconsistent, because absolute consistency involves 
computational complexity that exceeds the capacity of any existing mind.29  
Human beings live with inconsistency all the time.  Diarmaid MacCulloch 
observed that the Protestant Reformation had its deepest root in the doctrine 
of predestination (developed a millennium earlier by Augustine)—a doctrine 
in deep tension with obedience to the Catholic Church (which Augustine 
inconsistently also embraced).30  The inconsistency endured for a thousand 
years before it began making trouble in practice.  Maybe American practice 
cannot be justified.  But it is likely to persist, whatever the scholars do. 
Smith’s real concern is not merely inconsistency.  He thinks that 
secularism leads us to a condition in which we are fundamentally lost.  He 
thinks that our deepest moral convictions depend for “their sense and 
substance” on “notions such as those that animated premodern moral 
 
 24.  ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES 
AND UNITES US 370, 414–18 (2010). 
 25.  See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 922. 
 26.  JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: WITH GENEVA MANUSCRIPT AND 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 131 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., 1978). 
 27.  See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 923–24. 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  See CHRISTOPHER CHERNIAK, MINIMAL RATIONALITY (1986). 
 30.  DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION 103–08 (2003). 
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discourse—notions about a purposive cosmos, or a teleological nature 
stocked with Aristotelian ‘final causes,’ or a providential design.”31  This 
incoherence, he thinks, begets moral disintegration.32  The soundness of this 
diagnosis is a huge question, but the comparative claim about the relative 
weaknesses of secularism is unsound.  The question, whether moral 
discourse can make sense without implicitly depending on such notions, is, 
of course, an object of perennial contestation.  Smith’s solution merely 
displaces the lack of foundations to a different level, because there is no way 
to demonstrate a purposive cosmos, providential design, etc.  He thinks it is 
“intellectually irresponsible” to stipulate the equal worth of persons—one of 
the core commitments of liberalism—without some deeper foundation on 
which that commitment rests.33  But he has the same problem.  Why is it not 
equally irresponsible to stipulate God, whose existence is hardly self-
evident?34 
Consistency matters.  The efforts of political theorists to devise coherent 
accounts of our practice and to imagine better ways of realizing our ideals 
are valuable.  It is good for a society to be awake, to know what it is doing 
and why.  Keynes was right when he observed long ago that political theory 
in some sense rules the world.35  That is why I wrote Defending American 
Religious Neutrality.  Sometimes, if you can tell people a coherent story 
about what they are already committed to, their behavior will change.  
Culture wars are a struggle among elites,36 and elite opinion matters. 
 
 31.  STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 26 (2010). 
 32.  See id. at 26–27. 
 33.  See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 913–14. 
 34.  See Andrew Koppelman, Naked Strong Evaluation, DISSENT, Winter 2009, at 105. 
 35.   
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.  Madmen in authority, who 
hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few 
years back.  I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared 
with the gradual encroachment of ideas.   
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 383 
(1936). 
 36.  This is one of the few points of convergence between James Davison Hunter and Alan 
Wolfe in IS THERE A CULTURE WAR?: A DIALOGUE ON VALUES AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 
(2006).  There are, of course, deep divides within the electorate, but those concern race as much as 
religion.  See id. at 93.  The culture wars in politics are a battle among white voters who hold a 
diminishing share of the electorate.  See ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE POLARIZED PUBLIC?: WHY 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS SO DYSFUNCTIONAL 18–35, 62–82 (2012). 
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But the big difference between the theorists and those they influence is 
that most people are not troubled by theoretical difficulties.  Smith’s gloom 
overstates the efficacy of these theoretical debates.  If we theorists decide 
that the culture will automatically dance to our tune, then we need to get 
over ourselves.  We do not matter that much. 
